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The emergence of VoIP technologies brings people to think about moving away from the traditional 
PSTN network and switching to VoIP. Consequently, security and reliability issues of VoIP networks 
arise for those who use VoIP and since then VoIP security and reliability become interesting topics 
discussed by information security practitioners around the globe. This paper presents a mechanism in 
mitigating the denial-of-service attacks by using the cryptographic puzzle mechanism. In order to 
depict the real situation of VoIP networks, this paper will use VoIP technologies such as VoIP PBX, SIP 
protocols and IP phones to demonstrate the result of the cryptographic puzzle implementation. In the 
end of the paper, discrepancies and possible improvements for future works will also be discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 What is VoIP? Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a rising technology that can revolutionize the way the world 
communicates. VoIP is also commonly known as converged networks since it 'converges' the voice and 
data networks into one network [Wallingford, 2005]. Advances in today's technologies make VoIP 
networks available to handle both voice and data transmission as well as multimedia applications. 
Using VoIP, people can talk to each other, chat, hold a teleconference, or even fax a document to a 
printer server with only one network. 
  There are many benefits that people can get from VoIP networks. First, converging data and voice 
under the same networks provides cost-saving solution for enterprises. Instead of focusing on several 
networks, enterprises can now focus on one and by running the data and voice packets in one stream, it 
makes the enterprise network more manageable. Although the implementation may be costly, 
enterprises can gain benefits from the lower operational cost in the long run [Wallingford, 2005].  
  The second benefit from VoIP network is that any mechanism that can be applied to IP networks is 
applicable to VoIP networks. In the legacy Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN), for instance, 
voice encryption is very expensive and restricted to certain government institutions. In VoIP networks, 
however, encrypting voice is as simple as encrypting the transmitted packet over IP. The general idea is 
that VoIP applications are easier to program.  
  There are more advantages than the two mentioned above. Using VoIP, people can call their 
families, relatives or business partners abroad at a very cheap price since roaming does not exist in the 
VoIP world. Unlike the mainstream telco providers, most VoIP providers give features such as 
voicemail, call-forwarding and 3-way call for free. With all these benefits , it is no wonder why people 
are moving to VoIP. 
  However, these benefits do not come for free. There are many challenges and concerns that need to 
be taken into account. How reliable is VoIP? How secure is it? Can someone eavesdrop on a 
conversation? Can someone steal the data that I send over the network? What is going to happen if the 
VoIP server crashes? Before answering these questions, we will first review what causes a system to be considered as a secure and reliable system. 
 
1.2 What makes a system secure? 
Prior to discussing VoIP security, it is a good idea to know what makes a system or an application 
secure. A system is secure when it can protect/deliver the data/services requested, stored or passed 
within it. The CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity and availability) are the three main widely accepted 
variables in information security. There is also another concept called AAA (access control, 
authentication and auditing)
1 which are the mechanisms that supports CIA [Dubrawsky, 2007]. If an 
application can ensure and implement these concepts appropriately, then it is categorized as secure 
application [Porter, 2006]. Let's go through these concepts briefly. 
 
- Confidentiality 
Nowadays, there is a lot of sensitive data being sent over the Internet. Our names, dates-of-birth, 
addresses, and credit-card numbers are common types of data being sent over the Internet and 
considered as sensitive data. The challenge of protecting this data is increasing as more and more 
attackers try to steal it by exploiting through vulnerabilities that exist in applications or networks.  
  Security experts define confidentiality as the concept of protecting sensitive data from being 
viewable or modifiable by an unauthorized entity [Lehtinen, 2006]. Confidentiality can also be 
regarded as a concept that assures that any unauthorized third party should not know anything about 
what is stored or transmitted in the media [Adams, 2002]. If data can be sniffed, viewed,  or modified 
by unauthorized parties, then the system in which the data is stored in or transmitted over does not have 
confidentiality and thus categorized as not secure. 
 
                                                 
1  There are some people (such as those from Cisco) who refer AAA as authentication, auditing, and accounting. However, 
they still mean the same thing, just different terminology [Dubrawsky, 2007]. - Integrity 
Computer networks create a virtual connection between one person and another. Recall that the Internet 
is a computer network on a very large scale. Using the Internet, people no longer to be physically 
present in order to talk to each other because of services like instant messaging or VoIP calling and they 
do not have to physically go to their banks to pay their bills because of online banking. However, the 
Internet is a public network. People have to be sure that the data that they are sending and receiving 
over the Internet will not be tampered by others. Imagine if we go to our bank website to pay $25 for 
our monthly telephone bill, but in transit, there is another zero added behind the number 25. There will 
be many disorders and complaints as a consequence of such an error. 
  Integrity is the concept of keeping the data intact from any unauthorized entities while it is in transit 
or inside the storage [Lehtinen, 2006]. The presence of data-integrity in a system proves to be very 
important for a system to be deemed as secure. If there is no assurance that the data cannot be kept 
intact from unauthorized entity, then the system does not have integrity and thus categorized as not 
secure. 
 
- Availability 
Availability is the concept of a system being usable when needed. In other words, the data or services 
requested by authorized clients have to be available. Sometimes, a service may not be available when 
users need it. For example, placing or receiving a call in VoIP is one service offered by the VoIP server 
to legitimate clients. When the VoIP server crashes, consequently the service is no longer available and 
placing or receiving a call becomes an impossible task. Another well-known example is when an 
application freezes. It then becomes unresponsive and no matter what the users do, they will not get the 
services or information requested. 
  
We have briefly discussed what the CIA triad are and we now want to look at the mechanisms that supports them which are AAA: access control, authentication and auditing. As we said earlier, AAA are 
the mechanisms used in protecting data as well as the equipment in which it is stored or over which it is 
transmitted [Dubrawsky, 2007]. The three aspects of AAA can be regarded as parts that work together 
in providing confidentiality, integrity and availability in a system. We will briefly discuss each aspect 
of AAA. 
 
- Access Control and Authentication
2 
As the name implies, we can think of access control as the process of controlling how access to some 
data in a system is governed while authentication is the process of ensuring that users are really who 
they claim to be. Access control governs which users should be able to access some data or services 
while authentication governs the mechanisms present before they are be able to view or modify the 
data. For example, when a user wants to open an email account. He or she should first have access to 
the Internet. Second, he or she should have the right combination of username/password for that 
particular account. 
 
- Auditing 
Auditing is the process of monitoring the interaction between the users and the system. Auditing may 
also include monitoring the activities of the system and the outside world. Auditing proves to be useful 
in ensuring that security policies are practiced appropriately by the users. It can be regarded as the 
mechanism of tracking who is doing what at what time. Therefore, it is useful for legal activities since 
it can collect the list of activities done by the users [Dubrawsky, 2007]. One well-known example of 
auditing is the log-file analysis. Log-file analysis is an activity where one analyzes the log files in a 
                                                 
2  There is a fine difference between access control and authentication. The problem comes from the notion that having  
access to a certain data does not mean having authorization to view or change the data. Simply put, access control is the 
key of your apartment and the authentication is the activity of putting the key into the lock and trying to open it 
[Dubrawsky, 2007]. Because of this difference, we will discuss access control and authentication together. system. Tripwire (www.tripwire.com) is an excellent auditing tool that uses changes in log files to 
report illegal activities. We should now have a general principal about what makes a system secure. 
 
1.3 The goal of this paper 
This paper will be dealing with the availability issue in a VoIP system. This paper will also show that 
having a mechanism to keep a system available is critical. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the cryptographic puzzle (or puzzle) mechanism in protecting the availability aspect of 
a system. In particular, this paper will compare a VoIP server which is equipped with the puzzle 
mechanism and the one which is not when a denial-of-service attack is being launched against it. This 
paper will be using Asterisk (www.asterisk.org) as the main VoIP server and Session-Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) as the main protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: VoIP Security Issues 
 
2.1 Where does it all come from? 
VoIP security problems stem from the fact that VoIP networks are based on IP networks. Simply put, IP 
networks are intended for data, but not voice. VoIP networks are basically trying to treat voice as data 
which means that security practices for data networks should be implemented as well [Porter, 2006]. 
This is quite different than the traditional PSTN networks which are intended for voice and implement different security practices. 
  Everything about VoIP sounds perfect until people realize that it runs over the TCP/IP network. 
This means that all vulnerabilities in IP networks are inherited to VoIP networks [Wallingford, 2005]. 
All attacks that are applicable to IP networks are applicable to VoIP networks as well. Consequently, 
eavesdropping, spamming, sniffing, or denial-of-service attacks are possible in VoIP networks but not 
in traditional PSTN networks. We will give some examples how VoIP networks can be compromised 
which show us that, without good security practices, confidentiality, integrity, and availability issues 
are big problems for VoIP. 
  The first issue that we will touch on is the confidentiality issue. Voice transmission in VoIP 
networks is not that secure since any unauthorized parties can eavesdrop or sniff the conversation 
relatively easily; while in PSTN, in order to sniff, permission from the government is required as well 
as special hardware to tap into the conversation. Tapping a conversation in VoIP networks is the same 
as sniffing regular IP packets in the network. It is known that there are many applications that can 
eavesdrop VoIP calls such as voipong (http://www.enderunix.org/voipong/). By running voipong when 
a VoIP call is established without encryption, then the “packetized” conversation can be sniffed. 
voipong also makes a .wmv file as a final result for anyone to hear.  
  Since it is easy to sniff a packet, by the same token, it is just as easy to inject a packet. For example, 
if Alice says, “Hello, how are you?” to Bob, then under VoIP networks, it will be 'packetized' before it 
is transmitted. En route, a third party can sniff the traffic, and inject (or delete) an extra packet. By the 
time Alice's message arrives, it may not be the same as when it was sent. 
  One of the largest issues of VoIP network is how to keep the system available to the users. Many 
attacks can be launched against a VoIP server which can crash it completely. One prominent attack is  
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Due to the nature of IP-based networks, VoIP networks are very 
vulnerable to this attack. In fact, DoS attacks are classified as one of the most dangerous attacks 
[http://www.silicon.com/]. By simply sending a worm that can generate network packets, a VoIP network can be disrupted to the extent that voice quality becomes so low such that the communication 
is unintelligible. Even worse, this type of attack can eventually crash the server, causing the function of 
placing or receiving a call becomes unavailable.  
 
2.2 VoIP Defense To-Date 
As with every new and immature technology, there are many gaps that VoIP has to fill. From the 
previous section, we know that VoIP can be attacked from all angles in the CIA triad. Attackers can 
eavesdrop a conversation easily. Denial-of-service attacks are still the worst nightmare of every VoIP 
system administrator [Mirkovic, 2004]. With VoIP technologies spreading rapidly, many security 
practitioners are conducting research to improve the stability and reliability of VoIP services. In this 
section we will discuss what has been done to VoIP in terms of its security. 
 
- Network segmentation using Virtual LAN 
This method is applied to achieve logical separation between data and voice network so that a breach in 
one network does not affect the other. Using network segmentation, broadcast collision is also 
prevented from affecting VoIP channels. There are many papers that talk about this such as [Butcher, 
2007] and [Kuhn, 2005]. 
 
- Encrypting Media Streams 
Encrypting the channel where the voice or media is transmitted over is critical in protecting the system 
from eavesdroppers. In fact, there are many new protocols developed to ensure that the data transmitted 
over is encrypted such as ZRTP (developed by PGP creator, Phil Zimmerman) or SRTP. [Clayton, 
2007] and [Kopsidas, 2007] are two very interesting papers that discuss about securing media stream. 
 
- Other works There are also other works that have been done in securing VoIP such as using VoIP firewall, using 
IPSec to authenticate signaling mechanism, authenticate client configuration, and so on. Please refer to 
[Butcher, 2007], [Porter, 2006], and [Thermos, 2007] for more details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
 
3.1 SIP Overview 
The nature of programs such as chat, voice messaging and videoconferencing creates the need for a 
protocol that is able to set up a session between users, maintain the connection and eventually tear it 
down. For these purposes, SIP comes as the de facto standard of VoIP signaling protocol [Porter, 2006]. 
The nature of SIP architectures makes it a good fit for setting up a chat, phone or even videoconference 
session for users to communicate with each other. 
  SIP is a light-weight protocol—it is text-based. SIP is also a request-response protocol. What makes 
SIP a complete multimedia protocol is its ability to reuse other protocols in order to facilitate the 
communication between users. Once a session has been established SIP can then decide whether the session is audio or video, choose its appropriate codec, determine the address of the destination, handle 
the packets exchanged, and support certain functions such as using TLS for secure communication.  
  For example, in Asterisk, SIP uses the Real-time Transfer Protocol (RTP) to transfer packets to the 
endpoints. Thus, before any two users can talk to each other, they have to signal the server that they are 
ready to set up a communication session. This is done by SIP. Once the session is ready, then SIP uses 
RTP to transfer voice packets between the two users. For more details regarding SIP protocol such as 
its functionalities and network elements, please read RFC 3261 (www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3261.txt). 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 SIP Architecture 
SIP architecture can be divided into two main components: User Agents and SIP servers. 
−  User Agents 
User agents are the end-points in the communications. They are basically the logical functions that 
initiate and/or respond activities in SIP transactions. User agents also have two components: client and 
server. The user agent client (UAC) is the one responsible for initiating SIP requests and accepting SIP 
responds. On the other hand, the user agent server (UAS) is responsible for accepting SIP requests and 
sending back SIP responds. 
 
−  SIP Servers 
SIP servers are the computers in the middle of SIP communications. The servers are responsible for 
facilitating the establishment of the communications such as domain-name resolution. The servers can 
also determine the location of the endpoints in the network. For example, if a user moves to a different computer, then another user will have problems in initiating a communication session since the IP is 
different. The servers solve this problem by providing the IP address to every client registered in the 
servers. With this mechanism, no matter what computer a user uses, as long as he or she is registered in 
the server, then the servers will provide the appropriate IP address to the registered username. Thus, 
setting up a communication session will be easy. 
SIP servers can be thought of as being made of three components:  
−  proxy server : responsible for forwarding SIP request generated by a UAC to another entity whether 
it be a UAS or another proxy server. 
−  registrar server: responsible for handling registration of SIP clients 
−  redirect server: responsible for re-directing a UAC to find an alternative URI, which helps to push 
routing information for the server. 
After briefly discussing SIP main components, it is now a good time to discuss the SIP messages. As 
we know, SIP is a request-response protocol. There several request messages that a SIP client can 
generate: 
−  REGISTER: a request generated by the UAC notifying that it wants to register itself. It is done 
when the client is on-line. 
−  INVITE: a request to invite another UAC to establish a SIP communication session. 
−  ACK: a signal informing that the user accepts an INVITE, and is ready to establish a session and to 
exchange message with the other client. 
−  OPTION: a request to the other client, inquiring what capabilities are available before establish a 
session.  
−  SUBSCRIBE and NOTIFY: a request to determine the presence of the other user agent. This is the 
message telling whether the user is offline, online, busy, and so on. SUBSCRIBE is the request, 
while NOTIFY is the reply. 
−  CANCEL: a request that will cancel a pending request. −  BYE: a request to terminate a SIP session. 
 
As for the response messages, they indicate the processing of the requests, whether it was successful, 
failure, or in need of redirection. SIP has several response messages: 
−  1XX: indicates that the request is being processed. 
−  2XX: success; the request is accepted. 
−  3XX: redirection 
−  4XX: client error 
−  5XX: server error 
−  6XX: global failure 
Due to this architecture, many people choose SIP as the preferred signaling protocol. Not only does SIP 
have a simple architecture, but it can collaborate with other protocols. 
 
3.3 SIP security issues 
SIP is a lightweight protocol, but it is by no means easy to secure. SIP assumes that it can be used by 
any media with a no-trust relationship [Thermos, 2007]. There are also other features that make SIP 
hard to secure such as its ability to reuse other protocols and its peer-to-peer architecture. However, we 
will only discuss how to secure SIP signaling mechanisms so that it can minimize or event prevent DoS 
attacks, at least from the signaling point-of-view. 
  From the previous section, we know that SIP uses challenge/response mechanisms to authenticate 
the end-points. The end-points send INVITE message to the SIP proxy, and by default the proxy will 
reply with 407 Proxy Authorization Request message and a nonce to the end-points. By this time, the 
proxy will have a digest based on the nonce and password. The end-points will then calculate a digest 
using the nonce and password and send them back to the proxy. If the digest of the end-point matches 
the digest of the proxy, then the end-point is authenticated and INVITE will be processed. This mechanism is vulnerable to DoS attacks. Any client can flood the server with thousands of INVITE (or 
any other messages) exhausting the server's resources. This paper will try to implement the 
cryptographic puzzle protocol to prevent DoS from this point-of-view. That is, instead of letting the 
attacker flood the server, the server will send a puzzle that the client has to solve which will mitigate 
the attack. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Mitigating DoS Attacks with The Cryptographic Puzzle Mechanism 
 
4.1 What are cryptographic puzzles?
3 
As we know from the previous chapter, we need a mechanism that can deter the attacker from flooding 
our server with requests. A cryptographic puzzle (or puzzle) mechanism is a protocol to handle DoS 
attacks. Basically, when a DoS condition is detected, the server will react by sending a cryptographic 
puzzle to the attacker who sends the request. From this time, any request that the attacker (or a valid 
client) sends to the server results in a puzzle being sent by the the server. Figure 1 below shows the 
puzzle mechanism. 
 
                                                 
3  The following section and 4.3 are heavily based on the Internet draft: .http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jennings-sip-
hashcash-06 
  
  A puzzle is a four tuple [W, X, Y, Z] where W is a work number, X is a preimage string, Y is an 
image string, and Z is a value number. A preimage is a string containing of random string and the 
current time-stamp
4. An image is the SHA1 hash-value of the concatenation of the magic string 
'z9hG4bK' 
5 and preimage
6 
7. The work represents how much the client has to 'work' in order to solve 
the puzzle. For example, if the image is 10110101011011 and the work is 5, it simply means that the 
last five digits will be set to zero so that 10110101011011 will be 10110101000000. Then this will be 
the preimage that the server will send to the client/attacker while the original is kept. The value refers 
to how many bits match in the solution and is set to 160 since this is the maximum number of a SHA1 
hash result. 
So, a puzzle is a four tuple [W, X, Y, Z]
8: 
work W     = any integer from 1 - 160. 
                                                 
4  Some implementations also include URI of the request. [http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06] 
5  It is called the 'magic cookie' in SIP protocol. Please refer to www.z9hg4bk.org for details. 
 
6  The fact that the puzzle uses SHA-1 hash is important since SHA-1 is generally preimage resistant. The key thing to 
notice here is that by having preimage resistant hash function, it means that creating the puzzle is much easier than 
solving it which is very important property of the puzzle in handling DoS attacks. [Li, 2007] 
 
7  The term “generally” in the previous footnote applies since there are reports that say collisions exist such as [wikipedia-
crypto-hash-function] and [Schneier, 1996]. For more information about the properties of secure hash function in general 
or SHA-1 in particular, please refer to [Menezes, 1996]. 
 
8  Note that the puzzle is based on SHA1 hash function. If one would use other hash function, then Z and , consequently, 
the range of W might have to change. 
Figure 1: Cryptographic Puzzle Mechanism preimage X   = SHA1(random string | current time-stamp). 
image Y    = SHA1(“z9hG4bK” | X) 
value Z    =  160. 
 
 
4.2 Solving the puzzle 
A puzzle is solved when the string solution matches the string image. Let's take the following puzzle as 
an example: 
work value W = 10. 
preimage string X = SHA1(random string | current time-stamp | URI from INVITE) 
     = 01010110 00000101 01000110 01100010 00101100 01011011 01000110    
             00001101 00100110 01110101 00101100 00010011  01100011 01110110    
             00001000 01111100 00100000  01101110 01100010 01101000 
 
     =  “VgVGYixbRg0mdSwTY3YIfCBuYmg=”     (Base64 Encoded) 
image string Y   = SHA1(“z9hG4bK” | X) 
     =  "NhhMQ2l7SE0VBmZFKksUC19ia04="   (Base64  Encoded) 
value  Z   =  160 
The puzzle above is sent to the client with the 10 last bits of preimage string is set to 0: 
  01010110 00000101 01000110 01100010 00101100 01011011 01000110  
      00001101 00100110 01110101 00101100 00010011 01100011 01110110  
      00001000 01111100 00100000 01101110 01100000 00000000, 
 
which is equivalent to  (Base64 Encoded)  "VgVGYixbRg0mdSwTY3YIfCBuAAA=". 
 
Thus the client will receive a puzzle: [W, X, Y, Z] = [10,"VgVGYixbRg0mdSwTY3YIfCBuAAA=", 
"NhhMQ2l7SE0VBmZFKksUC19ia04=", 160] and then check if SHA1(“z9hG4bK” | X) = Y. If they 
are not the same, then the client will decode X into its binary equivalent, add 1, encode it into X' and 
check again if SHA1(“z9hG4bK” | X) = Y.  
 
To illustrate, the binary equivalent of the received X = "VgVGYixbRg0mdSwTY3YIfCBuAAA=” 
 
“  01010110 00000101 01000110 01100010 00101100 01011011 01000110        00001101 00100110 01110101 00101100 00010011 01100011 01110110  
      00001000 01111100 00100000 01101110 01100000 00000000 ” 
 
When we are adding 1 to X, it will become: 
“  01010110 00000101 01000110 01100010 00101100 01011011 01000110  
      00001101 00100110 01110101 00101100 00010011 01100011 01110110  
      00001000 01111100 00100000 01101110 01100000 00000001 ” 
 
But,  SHA1(“z9hG4bK” | X) = Y is still false. Then we add 1 again, so that X: 
“  01010110 00000101 01000110 01100010 00101100 01011011 01000110  
      00001101 00100110 01110101 00101100 00010011 01100011 01110110  
      00001000 01111100 00100000 01101110 01100000 00000010 ” 
 
We keep adding 1 until SHA1(“z9hG4bK” | X) = Y is true. Once the client finds the value of the X 
such that SHA1(“z9hG4bK” | X) = Y, then the client will send the puzzle with the solution [W, X, Y, Z] 
back to the server and the server will check whether the received X match the original preimage string. 
 
4.3 DoS attacks and how the puzzle handles them 
The Internet has become the very place where we do everything. Nowadays, it is very common to do 
most of our activities over the Internet such as reading news, buying books, exchanging stock markets, 
personal banking or even studying to get our bachelor degree. This has made the Internet becomes a 
very interesting environment for the attackers, especially to disrupt it or even make it unavailable to the 
people. 
  Denial-of-service or DoS is getting the attention in the Internet world as one of the most dangerous 
attacks [Cole, 2002]. Any IP-based networks are vulnerable to the DoS attack. As the name implies, the 
main goal of DoS attack is to disrupt or deny some services requested by users from a server. DoS 
attacks are usually achieved by overwhelming servers with so many requests or messages so that  
servers will slow down or eventually crash, causing it unavailable to give the service that legitimate 
users ask. This may disrupt services and cause them to not operate in the way they should.   Imagine if the server of a computer store is attacked with a DoS attack, causing it to go down for 1 
hour. Within this hour, the store may lose many customers wanting to buy computer online. How much 
revenue will the store lose due to this attack? Another example would be a server of an online 
university attacked with a DoS attack and causes the server go down for 3 hours. How many students 
are prevented from their study activities? What if there is an exam on-line and suddenly the connection 
is lost?
9 
  DoS attacks are deadly. Besides the fact that it is relatively easy to launch, its effect can range from 
a mild disruption to a system crash. We know that DoS attacks involve flooding some packets into a 
server, forcing the server to allocate some resources in order to process the packets. Thus, DoS attacks 
create a very high volume of traffic. It gets more complicated when the attacker will flood the server 
with different types of packets. Instead of flooding a 'virus' packet, the attacker can also send a 'worm'. 
These give us general ideas how to tackle DoS attacks. We can think that if we can put a “filter” so that 
we can profile all incoming packets, process the legit ones and dump the rest, the DoS attacks will not 
work. We can also think that if we can slowdown the rate of incoming packets so that the server does 
not have to exhaust its resources, then DoS attacks will not work as well. The puzzle uses the second 
approach. 
  The puzzle mechanism will slowdown the attacker because now the attacker has to divide its 
resources between sending the packets and solving the puzzle. Even though creating a puzzle requires 
some resources, the work that the attacker has to put in to solve the puzzle requires much more work. 
The ratio of resource usage of the server and of the attacker is large and thus will slowdown the speed 
of packet-flooding activity of the attacker [Li, 2007]. 
 
                                                 
9  In  real life, the effects from these examples are usually achieved by launching DoS from many machines which is 
   well-known as the distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS). This paper, however, focuses on preventing DoS 
attack launched from one machine, not the distributed one and because of this, the term DoS is kept instead of DDoS for 
simplicity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Puzzle Testing and Implementation 
 
5.1: Environment   and Attack Scenarios 
In this chapter, we will simulate how puzzle implementation can mitigate DoS attacks. We will 
simulate how an attacker launches a DoS attack against a VoIP server. Here is the environment of our 
simulation: 
Server                               : Asterisk 1.4.18  
Server IP address                  : 192.168.0.100  
Protocol        :  SIP 
R e q u e s t   t y p e        :   I N V I T E  
Network  analyzer      :  Wireshark  0.99.7 
DoS  attack  type      :  Flooding  Asterisk  with  INVITE  messages 
Attacking Program                 : inviteflood
10 
Puzzle  mechanism      :  PuzzleServer.java,  PuzzleMaker.java 
Puzzle  solver       :  PuzzleClient.java
11 
Attacking Machine IP address   : 192.168.0.103  
Processor        :  AMD  Turion  64  1.7  Ghz 
Memory        :  512  MB 
Client 1                             : GXP 200 hardphone  
                                                 
10 Available at www.hackingvoip.com 
 
11 Due to the size of the programs such as PuzzleMaker, PuzzleServer, PuzzleClient, inviteflood, and all programs that are 
related, their source code will not be shown in this paper. Please ask the writer for the source-code at: 
fsutomo@gmail.com. Client 1 IP address                : 192.168.0.101  
client 2                             : Linksys WIP 300 Voip Phone  
Client 2 IP address                : 192.168.0.105  
Client 3                             : Xlite 
Client 3 IP address                : 192.168.0.103  
The first scenario will begin with the attacker floods Asterisk with 500,000 INVITE
12 packets. The 
Asterisk, at first, will be without puzzle mechanism. We will analyze the attack as well as the effects 
after the attack. The second scenario will have puzzle mechanism implemented in Asterisk with the 
attacker only sends 100,000 INVITE packets. We will analyze how effective the puzzle mechanism is 
in mitigating DoS attacks. Figure 2 depicts our testing environment. 
5.2: Testing 
- Scenario 1 
Execute the packet-flooding program, the inviteflood: 
./inviteflood eth1 6666 192.168.0.100 192.168.0.100 500000 
What inviteflood is doing is that it will send 500,000 INVITE messages through interface eth1 for non-
existent client 6666 to the server, whose IP address is 192.168.0.100. 
 
                                                 
12 INVITE is one of the messages of Session-Initiation Protocol (SIP). For more information about INVITE and SIP, please 
refer to RFC 3261.  
 
 
We experimented the scenario 1 three times and the result is shown in Table 1. 
Figure 2: Testing Environment No  # of packets  Sending 
time (s) 
Interval (s)  # of call 
attempts 
# call 
failed 
Details 
1  500,000  45  1-45  9 9 500:Server  Internal  Error 
     45-50  3 2 500:Server  Internal  Error 
      > 50  -  -  Back to normal 
           
2  500,000  45  1-45  10 10 500:Server  Internal  Error 
     45-50  2 2 500:Server  Internal  Error 
     50-55  2 1 500:Server  Internal  Error 
      > 55  -  -  Back to normal 
           
3  500,000  46  1-46  11 11 500:Server  Internal  Error 
     46-50  2 2 500:Server  Internal  Error 
     50-55  2 2 500:Server  Internal  Error 
     55-60  2 1 500:Server  Internal  Error 
      > 60  -  -  Back to normal 
Table 1: Sending 500,000 INVITE packets to a non-existent client 
 
From Table 1, we know that while the packets were being sent (1-45s), it was (almost) impossible to 
place a call. In fact, approximately 13s after all packets were being sent, only several calls could go 
through. Figure 3 also shows Wireshark gave “500: Server Internal Error” showing that the server 
crashed due to the attack.  
Before we test Scenario 2, we will explain first how the puzzle is implemented inside Asterisk. The 
puzzle mechanism will be called by Asterisk with the command:  
Figure 3: 500:Server Internal Error Seen in Wireshark   fadil puzzle set workNumber <integer>
13  
With this command, Asterisk will activate PuzzleServer and PuzzleServer will ask PuzzleMaker to 
create a puzzle with workNumber = <integer>. Figure 4 shows us the architecture of the puzzle 
mechanism implementation in Asterisk to mitigate DoS attacks launched by the attacker. 
 
 
 
 
 
We will go now to Scenario 2. 
- Scenario 2 
Activate the PuzzleServer with workNumber = 5. 
                                                 
13 Please refer to the Appendix A for more details 
Figure 4: How our puzzle mechanism worksExecute the packet-flooding program, the inviteflood: 
./inviteflood eth1 6666 192.168.0.100 192.168.0.100 100000 true 
What inviteflood is doing is that it sends 100,000 INVITE messages through interface eth1 for non-
existent client 6666 to the server, whose IP address is 192.168.0.100. But this time, the attacker's 
machine will have a PuzzleClient installed (notice the true at the end of the command). We will also 
analyze when the workNumber is changed to 7. The result is in Table 2. 
 
No #  of 
packets 
Puzzle 
size 
Sending 
Time (s) 
Interval 
(s)  
# of call 
attempts 
# of call 
failed 
Details 
1  100,000  5  128  1-124  42  0  Every call went through 
       124-130  2  2  500:Server  Internal  Error 
       130-135  2  2  500:Server  Internal  Error 
        > 135  -  -  Back to normal 
              
2  100,000  5  124  1-122  45  0  Every call went through 
       122-125  2  2  500:Server  Internal  Error 
       125-130  3  3  500:Server  Internal  Error 
        > 130  -  -  Back to normal 
              
3  100,000  7  300  1-300  102  0  Every call went through 
       300-305  3  1  500:Server  Internal  Error 
        > 305  -  -  Back to normal 
              
Table 2: Result with puzzle mechanism 
 
 
We can see from Table 2 that by using puzzle mechanism, DoS attacks are greatly mitigated. In fact, by 
increasing the workNumber from 5 to 7, the time needed for the attacker to flood Asterisk was more 
than doubled and from 105 call attempts only 1 call that did not go through. This table clearly shows us 
how effective the puzzle mechanism is in mitigating DoS attacks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Discrepancies and future works 
Since our implementation is only for prototype and to show the effectiveness of the puzzle mechanism, 
there are many discrepancies that should be addressed in the future. In our implementation, Asterisk will process all incoming INVITE messages , including those sent by attackers, without authenticating 
the puzzle solution. This will create a chance for attackers to have their message processed without 
solving the puzzle. Attackers can build bogus solutions and send them each time they receive a puzzle. 
In its ideal implementation, Asterisk should only process messages with a valid puzzle solution. To 
achieve this goal, our implementation should have a two-way interaction between Asterisk and 
PuzzleServer instead of a one-way interaction. With a two-way interaction, PuzzleServer can tell 
Asterisk if a sender has solved the puzzle from a legitimate client so that Asterisk can process the 
message.  
  Another deficiency of our mechanism is that PuzzleServer is vulnerable to DoS attacks. Attackers 
can switch their target from crashing Asterisk to crashing PuzzleServer (and subsequently Asterisk) by 
flooding bogus puzzle solutions. In our implementation, we are trying to mitigate DoS attacks by 
introducing something which is potential to DoS attacks. Waters et al suggests a very nice modification 
in his paper [Waters et al, 2004] where he discusses that the PuzzleServer should be “outsourced to a 
secure, DoS-resistant entity”. Waters also makes some suggestions to make the puzzle distribution is 
based on public-key infrastructure (PKI). Moreover, he also introduces the notion of time-based 
“channels” in which a legitimate client can only connect to the server through these channels. By using 
time-based channels, then attackers have restricted time to complete their attacks. For more detail 
explanation about this work, please refer to [Waters et al, 2004]. Figure 5 below shows us how the 
puzzle implementation should be.  
 
 
 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
As VoIP technologies are widely spreading, it is expected that people and enterprises will switch to 
Figure 5: The ideal implementationVoIP. Consequently, the presence of security features for VoIP servers becomes critical as a lot of 
sensitive data are being transmitted over VoIP networks. This project has given a general picture of 
VoIP availability issue and a method to handle it which is the puzzle mechanism. To a certain extent, 
this project has also proven that the puzzle mechanism is an effective method in mitigating denial-of-
service attacks. Although this project does not have the ideal implementation of the puzzle mechanism, 
but it is still useful as a prototype as well as a real-case scenario example in securing a VoIP server. 
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Appendix A: Adding fadil puzzle set workNumber <integer> into Asterisk 
 
Command Line Interface (CLI) 
 
 
 
Step 1: Define fadil puzzle set workNumber <integer> in Asterisk compiler flags 
 
        Details: 
 
        − go to /usr/src/asterisk-X.X.X/build_tools/cflags.xml  
        − add the following: 
 
           <member name="FADIL_PUZZLE_SET_WORKNUMBER" displayname = "Set 
 
           the worknumber of the puzzle"> 
 
                 <defaultenabled>yes</defaultenabled> 
 
           </member> 
 
Step 2: Modify asterisk.c (changes to asterisk.c will be give in Appendix B) 
 
Step 3: Recompile Asterisk with make 
 
Step 4: Reinstall Asterisk with make install 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B:Changes to asterisk.c: 
 
 
−  in remoteconsolehandler function: 
 
 
static char fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber_help[] = 
   "Usage: fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber <integer-from-0-to-160>\n" 
 
  "Example: fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber 5\n"; 
 
 
 
−  create a handler function for fadil puzzle set workNumber <integer>: 
 
 
/* from fadil 
 
  * This is the function if fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber is invoked 
 
from Asterisk CLI 
 
  */ 
 
static int handle_fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber(int fd, int argc, char 
 
*argv[]) 
 
{ 
 
   //ast_cli(fd, "%d\n", argc); 
 
    if(argc != 5) 
 
     return RESULT_SHOWUSAGE; 
 
      
  ast_cli(fd, "Puzzle Mechanism is on! Asterisk is now          
  using 
 puzzle with worknumber is set to %s \n",               
 argv[4]); 
 
 
   //pass the workNumber get from CLI into the shell. 
 
   char command[] =  
 ”/home/fadil/Desktop/Comp4905/PuzzleProgram/executer-helper.sh  "; 
 
 
 strcat(command,  argv[4]); 
 
   system(command); 
 
   return RESULT_SUCCESS; 
 
} 
 
 
 
- in ast_cli_entry cli_asterisk[]: 
 
/******************************************************************** 
 ************ 
 
  * from fadil 
 
  * fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber 
 
  */ 
 
          { { "fadil", "puzzle", "set", "worknumber", NULL }, 
 
          handle_fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber, "Set the puzzle's 
 
worknumber", 
 
          fadil_puzzle_set_worknumber_help}, 
 